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Abstract 
The managerial ownership and its impact on financial decisions such as cash holding, and capital structure have been 
the subject of debate of corporate governance literature. The main objective of this study is to investigate the impact 
managerial ownership places on financing and cash holding decisions. In addition to that, the currents study is also 
offering an interesting insight on the issue of simultaneity of financing and cash holding decisions and also will 
discuss that how the interdependence changes as the level of managerial ownership changes. This study examines 
the data of 60 companies listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange over the period from 2013 to 2017.  To trace the 
endogeneity, we have employed the Wu Hausman test.  It evident from the results that the p-value of both models is 
significant, which confirms the endogeneity between cash holdings and capital structure decisions. In both models, 
the managerial the leverage and cash holdings are in positive relation. The MO appears in a non-linear relationship 
with both cash holding and capital structure decisions of textile firms. The results of the study are also providing 
support to agency theory, pecking order theory and signaling theory. 
Keywords: MO; Cash holdings; Financing; Textile; Pakistan. 
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1. Introduction 
The cash holdings and capital structure are corporate financial decisions which are the central to the conflict 
between managers and owners and during the last few decades, their assemblage has attracted an increasing amount 
of attention. The debates had started with the proposition of the perfect market hypothesis by the Sheikh and Qureshi 
(2017) In which they argued that the there is a perfect market, where the frim value is indifference of financial 
decisions because of no cost associated with them. According to them, the firm value must be seen as a function of 
the productivity of assets and the costs such as agency cost, transactional cost, opportunity cost and information 
asymmetry cost has no impact on firm value. Practically speaking, there are certain factors which affect the financial 
decisions and firm value, therefore, several researchers (Basheer, 2014; Jensen, 1986; Sheikh and Wang, 2012; 
Sheikh and Qureshi, 2017) abandoned the MM ideal world and acknowledged the significance of certain costs such 
as agency cost, transaction cost, opportunity cost which affect the firm financial decision 
One of the theocratical model which has been used as a base model behind the formulation of the codes of 
corporate governance as well examining the impact of financial decisions on the firm value in real or imperfect 
markets. Agency theory argues that there is a conflict between owners and managers on the issue of wealth 
maximization which also termed as the conflict of interest (Basheer, 2014; Chen  et al., 2018). There is a cost 
associated with the agency conflict known as the agency cost, which has a significant impact on the firm value (Chen  
et al., 2018; Sheikh and Qureshi, 2017). Many prior studies (Basheer, 2014; Sheikh and Wang, 2012; Sheikh and 
Qureshi, 2017) have reported that the agency cost has a significant impact on the managerial, financial decision and 
in turn on the firm value.  
The pecking order theory Myers and Majluf (1984), views the company financing strategy follows a hierarchical 
approach, in which it starts from the cheapest source of funds that are the company’s retained earnings in the form of 
cash  (Basheer, 2014) which further followed by safe debt issuance, finally equity issuance (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). The pecking order theory views the financing decisions and cash holding decisions as interdependent. 
Therefore, this theory suggests a negative relationship between cash holding and capital stature (Sheikh and Wang, 
2012). The capital structure is a blend of firm’s debt and equity financing (Basheer, 2014).  
The corporate governance is a mechanism which ensures to the stakeholders that the wealth maximization 
principals is being followed in a most honest and ethical way (Allen  et al., 2018). The mitigation of agency cost 
arising from the agency mentioned above problem is a prime objective behind the formulation of any code of 
corporate governance (Allen  et al., 2018; Basheer, 2014). The managerial ownership which is proxied by the total 
shares held by the mangers and directors is seen as the solution of agency conflict as it helps in aligning their interest 
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(Basheer, 2014; Hoang  et al., 2017; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Sheikh and Wang, 2012). However, many researchers 
(Basheer, 2014; Hoang  et al., 2017; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) have argued that the relationship between financial 
decisions such as cash holdings, a capital structure with MO is non-linear. 
 
Table-1. Yearly Mean Value of Shareholding Pattern 
Percentage of share held by  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Mean N=6 
a. Directors  45.0 45.00 45.00 46.00 47.00 48.00 46.00 
b. Financial Institutions  10.00 10.00 9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 8.00 
c. General Public 10.00 11.00 11.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 11.00 
d. Other firms    35.00 34.00 35.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 34.00 
*Grand Total   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: *Grand total is the summation of (a, bc and d); N=60 
Source: Company’s Annual reports  
 
The prime objective of the current study is exploring the impact of managerial ownership on the financial 
decisions. In addition to that, we are also interested in knowing that how the relationship between the cash holding 
and capital structure changes with changing the level of managerial ownership. We are also interested in knowing 
that either there is endogeneity between the cash holding and capital structure decisions. The reason why we have 
chosen the textile sector are; 1) it is the biggest non-financial sector in Pakistan ii) the average managerial ownership 
in textile sector of Pakistan is around 46 percent which is higher than the mean value of  22 percent in the sample of 
138 non-financial firms reported by Basheer (2014) and 29 percent in 155 firms reported by Sheikh and Wang 
(2012) as shown in table 1. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. MO and Capital Structure 
The percentage of shares held by the company’s directors is proxied as the managerial ownership (Basheer, 
2014; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).  Many notable researchers (Akhtar  et al., 2018; Basheer, 2014; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mishra and Kapil, 2017; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Sheikh and Wang, 2012) have 
reported that the managerial ownership as a solution of the agency problem. According to them, the managerial 
ownership helps in aligning the interest of owners and managers which in term mitigates the agency cost. This also 
provides a solution to agency problem broached by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Basheer (2014) and Sheikh and Wang 
(2012) that in the absence of the managerial ownership the entrench mangers may accept any project with lower 
NPV. This is providing support to the Fama and Jensen (1983), who are among the first to broach the issue of 
managerial opportunism and argued it as the main determinants of agency problem and also claimed that the MO 
inversely affects the managerial opportunism behavior. The capital structure decisions are among the most debated 
topics in corporate finance (Sheikh and Wang, 2012). Different theoretical models offer different justification for the 
factors affecting the capital structure decisions such as the agency theory view the debt as a control mechanism on 
the mangers (Brailsford  et al., 2002) 
Empirical evidence concerning the relationship between MO and capital structure offers no consensus. A group 
of studies (Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Salehi  et al., 2017) found a positive relation between MO and capital structure 
and provided support to the managerial incentive hypothesis that the managers with more incentives are closely 
aligned with outsiders and prefer higher level of debt as compared to independent managers. Whereas Sheikh and 
Wang (2012) have found that the MO is in a negative relationship with capital structure. They argued that firms in 
developing countries trade-off MO and debt to control agency cost. Friend and Lang (1988) argue that increased 
ownership of insiders leads to reducing leverage level as managers try to reduce the bankruptcy risk. This leads to a 
negative relationship between MO and leverage (Wahyudin and Solikhah, 2017). However, increased MO could lead 
to enhanced managerial influence and voting power. 
Consequently, they might change the debt level to maximize their benefits by obtaining more cash (Ozkan and 
Ozkan, 2004). This could lead to a positive relationship between managerial ownership and financing decision. 
Meanwhile, many prior studies (Al-Najjar and Clark, 2017; Basheer, 2014; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) argued that MO 
offers a non-linear relationship with agency cost. So, by literature reviewed we have drawn the following hypothesis  
H1: MO is a non-linear relationship with firm capital Structure. 
 
2.2. MO and Cash Holding  
Cash holdings are one of the major financial decisions made by managers. In the occurrence of inflow of cash, a 
manager must decide whether pay cash dividend or stock dividend. Some studies examine the determinants of 
corporate cash holding (Opler  et al., 1999; Rashid, 2016). 
Three main theories are suggested by theoretical finance literature to explain the reasons for firms to hold cash. 
Firstly, about the separation of control and ownership, it has already been recognized as a source of agency problems 
between managers and shareholders in a firm. According Jensen (1986), managers tend to focus on having a large 
cash reserve to pursue their benefits. On the other hand, the study by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) concludes that 
because of highly concentrated ownership in Asian firms, controlling shareholders attempts to maximize their 
benefits. This creates a conflict between majority and minority shareholders (Hamid  et al., 2016). Secondly, the 
information asymmetry theory, which is closely related to the pecking order theory, describes cash as the main 
The Journal of Social Sciences Research 
 
186 
source of financing. Thirdly, trade-off theory weights the benefits and costs of holding cash by identifying optimal 
level of cash holdings (Ahmad and Ahmad, 2018). The main benefit related to cash holdings includes reducing the 
likelihood of financial distress. Moreover, Ferreira and Vilela (2004) declare that holding cash would help to reduce 
the costs of increasing external funds. 
(Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) find that MO at a lower level of ownership could be helpful in the alignment of 
benefits between shareholders and managers. They termed this alignment of interests as alignment effect. Thus, 
under the alignment effect, cash holding is negatively related to. However, where the managers’ stake in the 
company tends to increase, managers may choose to hold excess cash to fulfil their interests. Therefore, under the 
entrenchment effect, cash holdings are positively related to MO. However, if the MO in the company is high, then 
the alignment effect would be greater than the entrenchment effect as engagement in behaviors that could increase 
managerial benefits might be punished by investors in the form of lower stock price. Consequently, many prior 
studies (Al-Najjar and Clark, 2017; Basheer, 2014; Kusnadi, 2011) have found a non-linear relationship between 
MO and cash holdings, 
H2: MO is a non-linear relationship with corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.3. Corporate Cash Holdings and Capital Structure  
The empirical studies on the relationship between capital structure and cash holdings offer no consensus. The 
debate in the real market started when the Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their vintage paper have argued that the 
entrenched managers to pursue their self-interest prefers to hold a large amount of cash. They continued and argued 
that these entrenched managers hold cash for financing purpose and avoid debt financing which can act as a check 
on the entrenched managers, thus argued a negative relationship between leverage and cash holding (Basheer, 2014; 
John, 1993; Sheikh and Wang, 2011). 
According to Faulkender, (2004) the information asymmetry problem is one the key determinate of the 
financing decisions, which can cause the bankruptcy and financial distress cost. This argument is supported by the 
Graham and Harvey (2001) and Al‐Najjar (2015) found that the cash holdings are in negative relationship with 
capital structure decisions. Whereas the García‐Teruel and Martínez‐Solano (2008) found a positive and significant 
relationship between financing and cash holding decisions The interactions between leverage and cash show that 
there is interdependence between cash holding and capital structure decisions. Therefore, in line with the theory we 
have developed the following hypotheses: 
H3: Cash holdings affect leverage 
H4: Leverage affects cash holdings 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data Source 
To achieve the unique objectives of the current study, the data of textile firms are collected from the annual 
report of textile firms listed in Pakistani stock exchange throughout six years from 2012 to 2017. Initially all the 
listed firms operating in the textile sector of Pakistan are chosen as a sample, however, later the firms with 
incomplete data or the leverage ratio more than one are excluded from the final sample. The final sample comprises 
360 firm-year observations. 
 
3.2. Model Specification  
To find the interdependence of corporate cash holdings and capital structure, and to examine the nonlinear 
relationship between MO and corporate cash holdings and between MO and capital structure we have used the 
following  
                                                                        
                                         …………. (1) 
                                                                         
                                                        ) 
 
4. Data Analysis and Research Findings 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
The summary statists of the current paper are shown in table 2. The mean of the managerial ownership is 45 
percent which in in line with table 2. The debt comprises of 60 percent of textile sector financing and cash level is 
considerably low at 1.3 perce 
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Table-2. Descriptive statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
     360 0.00004 0.19368 0.0131 0.019 
         360 0.05719 0.99769 0.6048 0.188 
    360 0.00091 0.98963 0.4590 0.263 
     360 0.00000 0.96923 0.1918 0.225 
     360 -0.47689 0.29285 0.0282 0.083 
         360 -0.01440 0.27669 0.0064 0.018 
    360 0.00000 15.25691 0.6314 1.322 
      360 0.44568 0.92172 0.0923 0.134 
Valid N (listwise) 360 
    
 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
To examine the correlation between the explanatory variables and the dependent variables we have used the 
bivariate correlation. The results are reported in table 3. 
 
Table-3. Correlation Analysis 
 Cash Leverage  Mans Manc Prof Dividend  Mbr Cflow 
Cash 1        
Leverage -0.1830 1       
Man -0.0257 0.1483 1      
Manc -0.0810 0.1188 0.8929 1     
Prof  0.1456 -0.4363 0.1129 0.0579 1    
Dividend  0.1308 -0.2847 -0.0828 -0.0674 0.0882 1   
Mbr -0.0220 0.2994 -0.1216 -0.0935 -0.3391 -0.0720 1  
Cflow -0.1095 0.1030 -00027 0.0334 -0.2807 -0.2236 0.3642 1 
 
The highest correlation coefficient of 0.89 is observed for the relationship between the higher level of MO and 
lower level of MO.  The results of the correlation analysis are shown in table 3. 
 
4.3. Regression Results and Discussion  
The results of the corporate cash decisions are shown in the table 4   the Breusch-Pagan (BP) and Hausman test 
are used to choose the most appropriate model (Basheer  et al., 2019). The results of the Husamn test with Chi-
square value of 9.32 and p-value of 0.342 indicates the random effect as most suitable technique for the cash holding 
model the results of the pooled OLS, fixed effect, and random effect estimates are reported in the table 4. To resolve 
the issue of multilinearity the managerial ownership square is removed from the analysis. 
The relationship between managerial ownership and firm cash holding is positive whereas nonlinear as the 
relationship between the cube of the managerial ownership, and firm value is negative and significant. 
The relationship of capital structure, a higher level of MO, and market to book ratio with corporate cash 
holdings are negative whereas the lower level of MO, profitability, dividend, and variability of cash flow is in a 
positive relation with corporate cash holdings. Profitability and dividend are in positive relation while the cash flow 
and dividend in a negative relationship with cash decision of Pakistani textile firms. The results are consistent with 
the prior findings of Basheer (2014) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004). 
We have started our analysis with the pooled OLS however the LM test, and Hausman test prove the fixed effect 
estimate as most appropriate estimates. The results of the study provide support to the hypothesized results as 
managerial ownership is a positive and significant relationship. Whereas all other factors are in a negative and 
significant relationship with financing decisions. 
The results of the study are providing support to the third and fourth hypothesis of the current study as the 
leverage and cash holdings are in negative but significant relations. The results are consistent with the prior findings 
of Basheer (2014) and providing support to pecking order theory which argued that the firm with excessive cash 
would avoid debt financing. Overall the results are providing support to agency theory, signaling effect and pecking 
order theory. 
The nonlinear relationship between the managerial ownership and financial decisions are providing support to 
alignment and entrenchment hypothesis (Basheer, 2014; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). According to these authors under 
alignment effect, financial decisions are negatively related to MO. However, where the managers’ stake in the 
company tends to increase, managers may choose to hold excess cash or excessive debt financing to fulfill their own 
interests. Therefore, under entrenchment effect, cash holdings are positively related to MO. However, if the MO in 
the company is high, then the alignment effect would be greater than the entrenchment effect as engagement in 
behaviors that could increase managerial benefits might be punished by investors in the form of lower stock price 
which is in our case.  
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Table-4. Regression results of Cash Model 
 
*Significant at the 10% level., ** Significant at the 5% level., and *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 Table-5. Regression results of Financing Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, and *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
5. Conclusion  
The prime objective of the current study is exploring the impact of managerial ownership on the financial 
decisions. In addition to that, we are also interested in knowing that how the relationship between the cash holding 
and capital structure changes with changing the level of managerial ownership. We are also interested in knowing 
that either there is endogeneity between the cash holding and capital structure decisions. This study examines the 
data of 60 companies listed on Pakistan stock exchange over the period from 2008 to 2013. The period from 2008 to 
2013 is selected because it comes before implementation of the revised code of corporate governance of Pakistan 
2012.  
According to regression results reported in the table 4 and table 5, the relationship of capital structure, a higher 
level of MO, and market to book ratio with corporate cash holdings are negative whereas the lower level of MO, 
profitability, dividend, and variability of cash flow are in a positive relation with corporate cash holdings. Which 
indicates that the Mo has significant impact on financing descensions. The results of the study provide support to the 
hypothesized results as managerial ownership is a positive and significant relationship with capital structure. 
Whereas all other factors are in a negative and significant relationship with financing decisions. The results of the 
study are providing support to the third and fourth hypothesis of the current study as the leverage and cash holdings 
are in negative but significant relations. The results are consistent with the prior findings of (Acharya  et al., 2012; 
Basheer, 2014) and providing support to pecking order theory which argued that the firm with excessive cash would 
avoid debt financing. Overall the results are providing support to agency theory, signaling effect and pecking order 
Dependent Variable:     
Pooled OLS 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
Random Effect 
Coefficient  
(p-value)  
            -0.0177***      -0.0005 -0.0089 
 
(0.010) (0.953) (0.244) 
         0.0198**      0.0154 0.0170** 
 
(0.027) (0.395) (0.149) 
        -0.0254**     -0.0238 -0.0243* 
 (0.014) (0.228) (0.071) 
     0.0222        -0.0313* 0.0284* 
 (0.176)   (0.074) (0.075) 
        0.0797      -0.0488 0.0633* 
    (0.183)    (0.394) (0.248) 
      -0.0004   -0.0001 -0.0002 
    (0.579)    (0.888) (0.797) 
        -0.0097 0.0147 0.0155 
    (0.286)    (0.238) (0.864) 
    0.0740 0.018 0.06 
Number of firms  60 60 360 
Dependent Variable:         
Pooled OLS 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient  
(p-value) 
Random Effect 
Coefficient  
(p-value)  
         -1.089***      -0.020*** -0.211 
 
(0.010) (0.953) (0.541) 
         0.256***      0.051*** 0.182** 
 
(0.000) (0.628) (0.037) 
        -0.154*     -0.176** -0.174* 
 (0.059) (0.130) (0.076) 
     -0.756***        -0.661*** -0.697*** 
 (0.176)   (0.000) (0.000) 
        -2.311*      -0.460*** -0.794** 
    (0.000)    (0.174) (0.021) 
      -0.004   -0.009*** -0.005 
    (0.528)    (0.164) (0.389) 
        -0.161** -0.098* -0.110 
    (0.024)    (0.1.81) (0.113) 
    0.352 0.168 0.277 
Number of firms  60 60 60 
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theory. Simultaneity can cause endogeneity problem, which occurs when one or more dependent variables are jointly 
established with the other dependent variables, usually with the help of an equilibrium mechanism. Based on 
information asymmetric and agency theories, it was expected that cash holdings and leverage might be 
simultaneously determined. Therefore, the Wu Hausman test is performed to determine the existence of endogeneity 
problem.  The p-value of both models is significant. This indicates that the cash holding and capital structure can be 
determined simultaneously.  
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